

Dilatory or Anticipatory? Voting on the *Journal* in the House of Representatives

March 12, 2008

Abstract

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the *Journal*, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply *pro forma* motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd-107th Congresses, I show that votes on the *Journal*'s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House *Journal* were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days. The findings of the paper suggest that the *Journal* vote may be informative for scholars interested in examining the determinants of legislator behavior in the House of Representatives.

1 Introduction

On January 12th, 1991, the United States House of Representatives recorded 4 roll call votes: the first vote concerned the approval of the House's *Journal* and the final 3 recorded votes were on *H.Con.Res. 32*, *H.Con.Res. 33*, and *H.J.Res. 77*, respectively. These resolutions essentially gave President George H.W. Bush authority to use the United States military to attack Iraq.¹ These were not unanimously approved – the key vote was on *H.J.Res. 77* (Roll Call 8), which split along party lines, with the final tally being 250-183.² Given the extreme importance (and commensurately high electoral visibility) of the day's business, why would the House spend its time recording an apparently *pro forma* vote?

In this paper, I examine this question by investigating the natures of both legislative behavior and business as a function of whether the day in question began with a recorded vote on the Speaker's approval of the *Journal*. Drawing a distinction between days on which such a vote was taken (referred to as "*Journal* days") and all other days (referred to as "*non-Journal* days")

¹Prior to these votes, a renewed debate about the War Powers Act had attracted a great deal of attention. Accordingly, *H.Con.Res. 32* expressed the sense of Congress that its approval was necessary for military action. *H.Con.Res. 33* was effectively an anti-war resolution, and *H.J.Res. 77* actually authorized military action.

²Party totals for this vote were D: 86-79, R:164-3, I:0-1.

is appealing for two reasons. First, recorded votes are easily observable. Second, and more interestingly, a recorded vote on the *Journal* is essentially a vote with no potential instrumental effect.³

Since the introduction of the new procedures for dealing with the *Journal* in the 92nd Congress, *all* votes on the Speaker's approval of the *Journal* have been decided in the affirmative. However, these votes are not infrequent – indeed, the frequency of with which members (of both parties) request a vote on the Speaker's approval is puzzling. A principal motivation of this paper's analysis, then, is whether objecting to the Speaker's approval is indicative of some dynamic underlying the House's business at the time of the objection. To lay out the main argument ahead of time, the evidence suggests that votes on approval of the *Journal* are frequently recorded in order to prepare for important legislative business. For example, it has been suggested that these votes are recorded prior to important matters in order to ensure that a sufficient number of appropriately-minded members are in attendance (Sinclair (1995)). Along these lines, it is clear that a failure to pass *H.J.Res. 77* would have been a political disaster for the House leadership. Recording a vote on the *Journal* “blocks off” a period at the beginning of a day's roll call voting during which members will come to the floor of the House. In a very practical sense, bringing members to the floor facilitates the efforts of bill managers, party leaders, and other interested members to count heads, poll the rank and file, and potentially influence members' votes.

This portrait of the role of the *Journal* vote is supported by the results presented here insofar as they indicate that the business conducted on *Journal* days is systematically different from that conducted on non-*Journal* days. In particular, a recorded vote on the approval of the *Journal* is correlated with closer and more partisan votes on the floor of the House later that day. While this regularity is arguably interesting in its own right, the results have implications for broader and deeper concerns within the study of Congress. For example, the results suggest that those searching for the effect of partisanship on roll call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives may not be looking in the right place. All roll calls are not created equal and, more to the point, they are not equally important to the party leaderships in the House.⁴

³The result of a failed vote on the Speaker's approval (which has never occurred) results in the Clerk beginning to read the previous day's *Journal*. In theory, the *Journal* can then be amended by members. Prior to the 92nd Congress, the *Journal* was to be read in lieu of unanimous consent or suspension of the rules to the contrary. The current system of approval of the *Journal* was part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.

⁴On this topic generally, see Riker (1959), King (1986), and Hug (2006). This point is more than methodological, since differentiation of roll call votes is relevant when considering whether a legislator is serving his or her constituents' interests (e.g., Coates and Munger (1995), Erikson and Wright (1997, 2000), Calcagno and Jackson (1998), Stratmann (2000), Bailey (2001), Fleck and Kilby (2002), Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan (2002)).

2 Comparing *Journal* Days and Non-*Journal* Days

I examine roll call votes from Congresses 102-107 and distinguish roll call votes by whether they were recorded on a day on which a *Journal* vote occurred.⁵ This analysis is predicated to some degree on the assumption that the real purpose of calling a *Journal* vote is to bring members to the floor. Regardless of whether one wishes to presume that this is the intended function of calling for a *Journal* vote, it is – empirically speaking – the principal effect of calling for such a vote. The presumption that this tactic may be used by bill managers and/or party leaders is made even more plausible by the Speaker’s ability to delay the vote on the *Journal* until later in the day (House rule XX, clause 8) and, furthermore, to allow it to stay open as long as he or she pleases. Thus, this maneuver provides centralized access to the membership of the House – access that may then potentially be used by one (or both) parties’ whips to canvass, cajole, and confer with members.⁶

Two Simple Observations. Two descriptive empirical findings motivate the paper’s analysis. First, votes recorded on a *Journal* day are nearly 10% more likely to be “party unity votes” than those taken on non-*Journal* days.⁷ Second, votes recorded on a *Journal* day are decided by a slimmer margin than those recorded on non-*Journal* days.⁸ Figure 1 illustrates how roll call voting on *Journal* days is different than on non-*Journal* days: roll call votes on *Journal* days are more partisan and decided by smaller margins.⁹ The increase in partisanship is statistically significant at any reasonable level ($p < 0.01$). The difference in vote margin is also significant ($p < 0.01$).¹⁰

Before continuing, two of notes are in order. First, these differences are both interesting in their own right and provoke the question of why they are observed. This paper will not offer a definitive (or causal) answer to this question. Nonetheless, I argue that a collection of substantively distinctive features about the business conducted on *Journal* days strongly suggests

⁵A vote on the approval of the *Journal* was recorded on 306 out of 1266 days on which a roll call vote was taken (24.2%).

⁶This regularity was relayed to me by a former Member of Congress, David McIntosh (R, IN; 1995-2001). As additional evidence of this motivation, these votes are typically called for by a (majority party) bill manager or a member of the minority party leadership.

⁷I use the common definition of a party unity vote: namely, any roll call on which at least half of one party’s members voted opposite of at least half of the other party. This measure of partisanship is not without its problems, of course, as discussed by Krehbiel (2000). Nevertheless, its prevalence in previous work – and the (necessarily) high correlation between aggregate vote-based measures of “partisan votes” – leads me to choose in favor of simplicity and rely on this traditional measure.

⁸The margin variable is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the number of Yeas and the number of Nays.

⁹The figure omits a subset of votes, namely those concerning suspension of the rules and constitutional amendments, for which the proper operationalizations of partisanship and closeness are more complicated.

¹⁰The difference in margins is particularly interesting because the average attendance for roll calls on *Journal* days is actually slightly higher (417.3) than for those on non-*Journal* days (415.9).




Figure 1: Party Unity and Closeness of Votes by Journal Day

that the vote on the *Journal* is not simply (or at least solely) a dilatory action perpetrated by members of the minority party. As mentioned above, the vote on the *Journal* signals (at least to the analyst) that the day's ensuing business is expected to be both partisan and contentious. While this in and of itself is not necessarily evidence that the vote on the *Journal* is more than a dilatory tactic, I present significant evidence against this hypothesis in the next section. Second, I strongly contend that even if a vote on the *Journal* were simply a dilatory maneuver perpetrated by those who expect to lose on the day's ensuing business, this informative value is still relevant to Congressional scholars.¹¹

Below, after describing the construction of the data, I distinguish between *Journal* and non-*Journal* days on several dimensions. I first – and in some sense most importantly – demonstrate that *Journal* votes are not simply the dilatory action of members of the minority party. In particular, both parties requested *Journal* votes, regardless of majority status, in each of the Congresses examined. After this, I examine difference in the composition of legislative business on *Journal* days in three ways: types of business receiving a roll call vote (*Journal* days were characterized by more procedural votes and fewer suspension votes), the closeness of votes (passage and procedural votes were closer on *Journal* days, whereas amendment votes were no closer), and the treatment of appropriations measures as opposed to other business (votes on appropriations matters were less likely to be party unity votes and also more likely to result in a close vote than other business). I then conclude with a discussion of some of the broader implications of this investigation for the study of Congress in general and House roll call voting in particular.

2.1 Data Construction

I classify all roll call votes taken on the same day as a roll call vote on approving the *Journal* as being a *Journal* day vote.¹² For the purposes of classifying a roll call as either a *Journal* day or non-*Journal* day vote, I use the data provided by Rohde (2004), which includes an indicator variable for votes on approving the *Journal*.¹³ I have combined this with data on the date of each roll call vote, allowing me to select all roll call votes falling on the same day as a vote on

¹¹I return to this point briefly in the conclusion. While space prohibits a more extended foray into the broad and deep literature discussing the importance of distinguishing between votes in Congress, it is also safe to assume that the reader who cares about such issues will be well aware of the literature in question.

¹²With very few exceptions, the approval of the *Journal* occurs prior to any other floor votes in the same legislative day.

¹³There is one vote in the dataset that is coded as a vote on approving the *Journal* but was not actually for this purpose. In the 107th Congress, the House returned after the 2002 elections to finish the Budget and deal with the proposed new Department of Homeland Security (which was ultimately created by passage and signature of the "Homeland Security Act"). The first recorded vote on November 13, 2002, was technically on a motion to adjourn, but is recorded here as a vote to approve the *Journal*. This vote was undoubtedly for the same purpose (ascertaining attendance) as a roll call on approval of the *Journal*. Accordingly, I have not changed Rohde's coding of this vote.

the *Journal*.¹⁴

2.2 Frequency of *Journal* Votes

The first two questions about *Journal* votes are (1) how frequently have they been called and (2) exactly who calls for them. Figure 2 offers an answer to both of these questions. The figure displays, for each of the included Congresses, the number of legislative days broken down by if the day was a *Journal* day and, if so, which party called for a vote to approve the *Journal*.¹⁵ The main implication of Figure 2 is that the majority party requested the *Journal* vote slightly more frequently than the minority party. Accordingly, Figure 2 lays to rest any initial presumptions that the *Journal* vote is simply a dilatory tactic employed by the minority party.

This point is particularly clear once one actually examines the rules and procedures of the House of Representatives. For example, in addition to the fact that members of the majority party call for *Journal* votes, it is also important to note that – for the members so inclined – there are other dilatory tactics that are available throughout the day and less easily circumvented by a determined majority (e.g., parliamentary inquiries, motions to recommit, objections to unanimous consent requests). Additionally (and perhaps most tellingly, in light of this paper’s motivations), the *Journal* vote is *not* dilatory in the sense that the Speaker can (and almost always does) delay the vote until later in the day to the period immediately preceding the “clustered” roll call votes. Second, a point of order that no quorum is present – necessitating a quorum call – is separate from the *Journal* vote. Finally, the dilatory aspect of calling a roll call vote is minimal at best since 1973, when the House adopted the use of electronic voting as part of the rules package for the 92nd Congress (prompted largely by the recording of votes in the Committee of the Whole as called for by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970).

2.3 Legislative Business: Different Types of Roll Call Votes

Votes on the *Journal* indicate that the day’s upcoming business will be different than on other days partly because of differences in both the procedures that will be used and the content of what will be voted upon later that day. To see this, I divided the data into four broad

¹⁴I corrected for the days that the House stayed in session past midnight, so that the data essentially matches with legislative days, rather than calendar days.

¹⁵This data was gathered by the author from the Congressional Record. Note that the *Journal* is approved at the beginning of a legislative day. Thus, at most one roll call vote on its approval can be taken each day. In most cases, this vote is called for by a single member. On three different occasions (8/11/1992, 3/29/93, and 3/30/93), two members were involved in calling for the vote. This is possible because the presiding officer typically calls for a voice vote on approval of the *Journal*. This vote is then generally challenged on a point of order for lack of quorum, at which point a recorded vote is requested. On the three occasions when more than one member was involved in this process, a member of the minority party demanded a vote on the chair’s approval of the *Journal*, after which a member of the majority party requested that a recorded vote be taken. All three of these occasions have been coded separately: while they are treated as *Journal* votes for the majority of the paper, they are *not* included in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Number of Journal Days, by Party that Requested Vote and Congress

categories based upon the type of each roll call vote. These four classes are simple majority votes on final passage, procedural votes, votes on amendments, and votes on final passage under suspension of the rules.¹⁶ This data, displayed in Figure 3, indicates two principal regularities of interest. First, on *Journal* days, a higher percentage of the recorded votes deal are procedural. This is consistent with the supposition that *Journal* votes precede matters that are of greater importance or salience to the House membership: while procedural matters are dealt with on all days, most are not subject to a roll call vote: given the relative invisibility of such votes to most constituents (Mayhew (1974), Asher and Weisberg (1978)), only those procedural matters that are important and/or contentious will be likely to be subject of a roll call vote (see also Roberts and Smith (2003)). This intuition is borne out by the averages displayed in Figure 4, which presents the average absolute margin of roll calls on all *Journal* and non-*Journal* days. On both types of legislative days, procedural votes had the smallest average absolute margin.

¹⁶As throughout, votes on approval of the *Journal* and constitutional amendments are excluded. In addition, for clarity of the graph, procedural votes recorded under suspension of the rules (which represent less than 1% of the roll calls in the sample) are also excluded.




Figure 3: Composition of Legislative Business on *Journal* and non-*Journal* Days




Figure 4: Closeness of Different Types of Votes on *Journal* and non-*Journal* Days

2.4 Legislative Business: Appropriations

Figure 5 describes the closeness of votes, disaggregated by whether the legislation dealt with appropriations or not.¹⁷ Considering only final passage votes with less than 90% on the winning side, passage votes on non-appropriations matters had smaller absolute margins and were more likely to be close on *Journal* days than those recorded on non-*Journal* days. Passage votes on appropriations matters followed a similar pattern, but the difference is more striking in that, while votes on appropriations matters were more frequently close than votes on non-appropriations matters, the average absolute margin on appropriations matters was much larger than for non-appropriations matters. This is consistent with both the supposition that much appropriations legislation is (close to) universalistic in nature, garnering wide and bipartisan support (e.g., Collie (1988), Weingast (1994), Bickers and Stein (1997), Carrubba and Volden (2000), Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde (2001)).

¹⁷Whether a vote dealt with appropriations or not is determined by the coding given in Rohde (2004).




Figure 5: Closeness of Votes on *Journal* and *Non-Journal* days, by Appropriations

Figure 6 examines the occurrence of party unity votes with respect to whether the legislation deals with appropriations. The work of Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Aldrich and Rohde (2000) (among others) suggests that – given the importance of appropriations matters for individual members’ pursuits of reelection – the appropriations process occupies a unique position in the maintenance of party unity, regardless of its origins. The data displayed in the figure illustrate that less party unity is exhibited in roll call voting when appropriations are being considered. Interestingly, the occurrence of a *Journal* vote has a smaller marginal effect on the observed party unity on appropriations measures votes. The difference in party unity between *Journal* days and non-*Journal* days is neither statistically nor substantively significant, whereas the difference for all other passage votes is significant in both senses. An interesting feature of Figure 6 is the difference between *Journal* day and non-*Journal* day votes for the two types of legislative business. Party unity is nearly 50% higher for *Journal* day roll calls on non-appropriations measures than it is for non-*Journal* day votes. For appropriations measures, the recording of a *Journal* vote has the predicted effect – it increases observed party unity – but only marginally so.




Figure 6: Partisanship of *Journal* day and Non-*Journal* day Roll Call Votes, by Appropriations

The difference between the proportions of party unity votes for non-appropriations measures is statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas the difference between the proportions for appropriations measures is not ($p > 0.15$). This is consistent with the standard interpretation of the Appropriations process as being more consensual and less partisan than other legislative business. The fact that *Journal* day appropriations measures do not display significantly higher rates of partisan roll call votes is very interesting in light of the fact that, contrary to House rules, the GOP leadership since the 104th Congress has increasingly used the Appropriations committee as a vehicle for *legislative* change (Aldrich and Rohde (2004)).¹⁸

The data presented in Figures 5 and 6 tell a familiar story about legislative business: appropriations measures are relatively few in number, high in electoral visibility and frequently quite easy for members to “figure out,” at least in terms of how to vote on final passage. (For example, many appropriations bills are considered “must pass” legislation.) Accordingly, partisanship is both less of a “cue” overall when voting on such legislation and, *a fortiore*, the ability of any member or members – regardless of whether they be party leaders or not – to sway an individual member’s vote on such legislation is more limited than when dealing with less visible and/or more complicated non-appropriations measures. Conversely, on appropriations measures, a bill’s managers have much more flexibility to alter legislation in ways that buy votes from “across the aisle,” because appropriations are, at the end of the day, sought by all members for their districts.

Accordingly (and at least in theory), appropriations measures are processed in a manner distinct from other measures considered by the House. Including all except “near unanimous” roll call votes, Figure 7 demonstrates that the non-appropriations business was treated differently by the Democratic and GOP leaderships during the 102nd-107th Congresses. Under the GOP leadership, non-appropriations measures were dealt with much less frequently on *Journal* days than was the case under their Democratic counterparts. This is not inconsistent with the analysis of the GOP leadership provided by Aldrich and Rohde (2000): the Republican party leaders have accomplished partisan policy goals through the activities of the Appropriations committee. Appropriations measures under the GOP leadership were perceived by some to be more controversial and of greater importance to the party leadership (Schickler and Pearson (2004)), than they were when the Democratic party controlled the House. Put slightly differently, the Democratic leadership attempted to achieve a higher proportion of its legislative agenda through traditional means (*i.e.*, authorization bills) than did the GOP leadership.

¹⁸Restricting attention to Congresses 104-107 does not alter the statistical significance of the difference between *Journal* day and non-*Journal* day votes, a specific instance of a more general point to which I turn in the next section.




Figure 7: *Journal Day Votes by Appropriations and Majority Party*

3 Conclusion

The results presented above clearly suggest indicate that *Journal* votes in the House of Representatives are far from *pro forma*. Viewed broadly, the differences between business conducted on *Journal* days and other days provides another indication of the truism that not all congressional activity is created equal. More importantly, this evidence resides within roll call voting records – perhaps the most well-trod and winding path within the modern empirical study of Congress. The results presented above suggest that roll call voting differed systematically between *Journal* and non-*Journal* days. Accordingly, scholars should consider whether the recording of a *Journal* vote might be informative in examinations of issues such as the effect (or presence) of party pressure, issue visibility, and timing (to name three) on legislators' vote choices.

Along these lines, a substantive motivation for this paper's examination is the examination of parties-in-Congress within the House. For example, it has been argued by many scholars that both parties' leaderships selectively pursue discipline in the modern House (Aldrich and Rohde (2000, 2004), Roberts and Smith (2003), Patty (2008), Sinclair (1998, 2000), Burden and Frisby (2004)) and the *Journal* vote is one practical way to provide the leaders with centralized access to their members. While party leaders arguably have several forms of scarce resources to allocate among their rank-and-file,¹⁹ the effective pursuit of individual members' *roll call votes* with such resources would clearly benefit from up-to-the-minute information gathering and arm-twisting that is in theory possible during the time in which a roll call on the approval of the *Journal* is recorded. This type of information can, for example, allow the majority and/or minority parties' leaderships to choose their battles judiciously.

Along these lines, I would argue that the results presented here are at least consistent with the suggestion that *Journal* votes are sometimes used to poll and/or persuade members about their choices on votes scheduled for later in the day. Principally, this consistency is suggested by the simple fact that roll call votes on *Journal* days are more likely to be partisan and more likely to be close. Taking this suggestion a step further, one might conclude that the search for party influence on roll call voting has perhaps not been focused on the right votes. Accordingly, the results of this paper (utilizing an easily obtained and yet frequently discarded piece of information) are relevant for a recent and active debate (*e.g.*, Snyder and Groseclose (2000); Snyder, Jr. and Groseclose (2001), Ansolabehere, Snyder, Jr., and Stewart, III (2001), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), Roberts and Smith (2003), Krehbiel (2003), Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Woon (2005), Roberts (2007)) about the proper way to draw distinctions between different

¹⁹A few examples that have been studied include committee assignments (Leighton and Lopez (2002)), staff (Sinclair (1981)), opportunities for promotion within the party organization (Loomis (1984)), preferential recognition of legislation (Woon (2008)), and the opportunity to offer amendments (Sinclair (1983), Bach and Smith (1988), Roberts and Smith (2003)).

roll call votes. In particular, the evidence presented here suggests that we should estimate two separate models: one for votes on *Journal* days and another for all other roll calls. An alternative description of the suggestion can be summed up by a quote that is attributed to Sir Winston Churchill: “Never hold discussions with the monkey when the organ grinder is in the room.”²⁰ The results here provide evidence that a *Journal* vote may indicate the arrival of the organ grinder.

References

- John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee. *Journal of Politics*, 62:1–33, 2000.
- John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. Congressional Committees in a Partisan Era. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, editors, *Congress Reconsidered*, pages 249–270. CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 8th edition, 2004.
- Steve Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart, III. The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26:533–572, 2001.
- Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg. Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process. *American Journal of Political Science*, 22(2):391–425, 1978.
- Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith. *Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives*. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1988.
- Michael Bailey. Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26(1):45–80, 2001.
- Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein. Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions. *Public Choice*, 91(3):229–249, 1997.
- Barry C. Burden and Tammy M. Frisby. Preferences, Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 29:569–590, 2004.
- Peter T. Calcagno and John D. Jackson. Political Action Committee Spending and Senate Roll Call Voting. *Public Choice*, 97(4):569–585, 1998.

²⁰Then again, those of us who study roll call data from the U.S. House might be well-served to recall a definition that is attributed to Albert Einstein: “Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

- Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 96(1): 127–140, 2002.
- Clifford J. Carrubba and Craig Volden. Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):261–277, 2000.
- Dennis Coates and Michael Munger. Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of Politics. *Southern Economic Journal*, 61:861–873, 1995.
- Melissa P. Collie. Universalism and the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921-80. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(4):865–883, 1988.
- Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright. Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress. In David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and John F. Ferejohn, editors, *Change and Continuity in House Elections*, pages 149–177. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2000.
- Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright. Voters, Candidates and Issues in Congressional Elections. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, editors, *Congress Reconsidered, 6th Ed.*, pages 132–161. Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, DC, 1997.
- Robert K. Fleck and Christopher Kilby. Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting. *Public Choice*, 112(1-2):31–53, 2002.
- Simon Hug. Selection Effects in Roll Call Voting. UC-Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper 2006-21, 2006.
- Mark S. Hurwitz, Roger J. Moiles, and David W. Rohde. Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House. *The American Political Science Review*, 95(4):911–922, 2001.
- D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1991.
- Gary King. The Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies: A Model and Statistical Estimation. *Social Science Research*, 15:135–152, 1986.
- Keith Krehbiel. Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44:212–227, 2000.
- Keith Krehbiel. The Coefficient of Party Influence. *Political Analysis*, 11:95–103, 2003.

- Keith Krehbiel, Adam Meirowitz, and Jonathan Woon. Testing Theories of Lawmaking. In David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, editors, *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions*, number XVI in Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, New York, NY, 2005.
- Wayne A. Leighton and Edward J. Lopez. Committee Assignments and the Cost of Party Loyalty. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1):59–90, 2002.
- Burdett A. Loomis. Congressional Careers and Party Leadership in the Contemporary House of Representatives. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(1):180–202, 1984.
- David Mayhew. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974.
- Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3):673–687, 2001.
- John W. Patty. Equilibrium Party Government. *American Journal of Political Science*, Forthcoming, 2008.
- William H. Riker. A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Call Votes in Voting Bodies. In J. C. Wahlke and H. Eulau, editors, *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*. Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1959.
- Jason M. Roberts. The Statistical Analysis Of Roll-Call Data: A Cautionary Tale. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 32(3):341–360, 2007.
- Jason M. Roberts and Steven S. Smith. Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971 – 2000. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):305–317, 2003.
- David W. Rohde. Roll Call Voting Data for the United States House of Representatives, 1953–2004. Compiled by the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program, Michigan State University, 2004.
- Eric Schickler and Kathryn Pearson. The house leadership in an era of partisan warfare. In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, editors, *Congress Reconsidered*, pages 207–225. CQ Press, 8th edition, 2004.
- Barbara Sinclair. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U. S. Congress*. CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2000.
- Barbara Sinclair. Majority Party Leadership Strategies for Coping with the New U. S. House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 6(3):391–414, 1981.

- Barbara Sinclair. *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1983.
- Barbara Sinclair. *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995.
- Barbara Sinclair. Do Parties Matter? Mimeo, University of California, Los Angeles, 1998.
- James M. Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose. Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):193–211, 2000.
- James M. Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose. Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3): 689–698, 2001.
- Thomas Stratmann. Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints. *American Political Science Review*, 94(3):665–676, 2000.
- Barry R. Weingast. Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism. *Political Research Quarterly*, 47(2):319–327, 1994.
- Jonathan Woon. Bill Sponsorship in Congress: The Moderating Effect of Agenda Positions on Legislative Proposals. *Journal of Politics*, 70(1):201–216, 2008.